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Klein: Some Lessons on Spacepower from Colin Gray

SOME LESSONS ON SPACEPOWER FROM COLIN GRAY

John J. Klein

Where is the theory of space power? Where is the Mahan for the final
frontier?
COLIN S. GRAY

Colin Gray passed away in February 2020. He was a prolific author, and many
within academia and at the service war colleges appreciated him as a great strategic theorist. Yet what is lesser known is the profound impact he made on the development of spacepower strategic thought.1 Absent robust historical experience
of conflict in space on which to draw, Gray’s writings led to a better understanding of space strategy. Crucially, Gray explained how spacepower theory should fit
within the context of the enduring nature of war, the better to inform the future
development of space-warfare strategy.
Gray published over thirty books on military history and strategic studies,
along with innumerable articles and monographs. His ideas and concepts are
lasting in their ability to illuminate the intricacies of politics, war, and strategy.
While Gray provided an abundance of strategic thought on which nationalsecurity and military practitioners could draw when considering the application
of spacepower, this essay will discuss three key subjects: Gray’s development of
spacepower theory, his influence as a teacher and mentor, and insights for today’s
space professionals and members of the new U.S. Space Force that can be drawn
from Gray’s writings.
SPACEPOWER THEORY
Early in his career, Gray showed an interest in space and its relation to the theory
of war. In 1982, when he was beginning a stint supporting the Reagan administration’s General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, he
published American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems
and Arms Control. It is noteworthy that the folJohn J. Klein is a senior fellow and strategist at Falcon Research Inc., and an adjunct professor at the
lowing year the Reagan administration would
George Washington University’s Space Policy Insticonsider the potential deployment of the Stratetute. He holds a DPhil from the University of Reading in England. He is the author of the books Under- gic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as “Star
standing Space Strategy: The Art of War in Space Wars.” For Gray, the publication was intended “to
(2019) and Space Warfare: Strategy, Principles and
encourage informed debate of U.S. space policy,
Policy (2006).
particularly military space policy.”2 In this relaNaval War College Review, Winter 2021, Vol. 74, No. 1
tively short study, he detailed many of his earliest
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ideas on spacepower and the character of space warfare, and he addressed U.S.
and Soviet technical space capabilities, offensive and defensive actions in space,
and the policy implications of the stationing of weapons in orbit. Gray would
continue to develop further space-strategy concepts and encourage the development of spacepower theory through his numerous works. Alongside land, sea,
air, and cyber power, Gray ensured that the strategic implications of spacepower
were considered.
Moreover, Gray frequently wrote on nuclear weapons and the imperative
to defend against their use. In noting the intersection of nuclear weapons and
spacepower, he considered nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles to be
space vehicles for most of their flight regime. Even though during the Cold War
nuclear weapons benefited mutual deterrence between the Soviet Union and
the United States, these “absolute weapons” were strategically unhelpful in use.
Consequently, nuclear weapons are inherently and fatally limited as a practical
war-fighting tool.3 Also, Gray believed that eschewing strategic defenses against
nuclear weapons was both imprudent and immoral. Gray argued for defenses
against nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as the basis for deterrence-bydenial strategy and a hedge against deterrence failure. In particular, he viewed
SDI as a credible defensive approach, potentially rendering Soviet nuclear-armed
ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete as reliable military instruments.4 Taken
as a whole, Gray’s views over the decades directly influenced both U.S. declaratory and action policies regarding missile defense and the eventual Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty withdrawal.
One of Gray’s best-known pieces on space strategy is his 1996 article “The
Influence of Space Power upon History,” written while he was professor of
politics and director of the Centre for Security Studies at the University of
Hull. In this article he defines spacepower as “the ability to use space while
denying reliable use to any foe.”5 He also laments that, despite spacepower’s
growing importance as a domain of warfare, no comprehensive theory of it
had been formulated and spacepower theorists remained scarce.6 He explores
the potential reasons for the scarcity of notable spacepower theorists, and the
epigraph that begins this essay comes from that article. Unbeknownst to Gray
at the time, the quotation inspired many writers of spacepower theory and
strategy who followed, including this author. Elaborating on the problem, he
explained that “[t]oday, space power suffers from an unusual malady—an acute
shortage of space focused strategic theory and the lack of a binding concept to
aid understanding of what it is all about. People today, including many military
professionals, remain less than enlightened on what space power is and does,
how it works, and how it can and should function synergistically with other
players in the joint military team.”7
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Gray thought that an in-depth understanding of the theory of war and past
strategic frameworks could be used to guide the development of a clearly articulated, all-encompassing strategy for military operations in and through space.
Despite a few previous efforts to develop a comprehensive theory of space warfare,
he observed that no adequate and fully comprehensive theoretical framework of
spacepower yet had been formulated and much work remained to be done.
Gray had many consistent themes in his writings throughout the decades,
including his frequent reference to Carl von Clausewitz and the Prussian strategist’s theory of war.8 Clausewitz provided Gray with much of his intellectual ammunition, and “The Influence of Space Power upon History” is no exception in
this regard. Clausewitz and Gray both held that the “grammar” and character of
strategy are in a constant state of change, but its fundamental nature and logic
are eternal. Drawing from this strategic truth, Gray advised that despite space
warfare having its own distinct character, spacepower theory needs to fit within
our understanding of Clausewitz’s writing and the enduring nature of war. Gray
wrote, “War in space has its own distinctive characteristics that policy must know
and respect, but that war has meaning only for the purposes of policy.”9 Despite
being a new domain in which to consider the matter of human conflict, war in
space—like war in all other domains—will serve the ends of policy in pursuit of
political objectives.
In his seminal book Modern Strategy, published in 1999, Gray wrote on spacepower’s place within the context of technological innovation and the future of
warfare. Drawing on the work of geostrategist Halford Mackinder and Gray’s own
novel thoughts regarding the strategic influence of geopolitics, Gray explored
spacepower from the perspective of geography, writing as follows: “[W]orks of
theory explaining spacepower should explore the interconnectedness, indeed
interdependence, of the different geographical environments. Spacepower is of
little interest per se. Strategic interest lies in the consequences of its application
for deterrence and the conduct of war as a whole, within a context lit by steady
recognition of the authority of the principle that the land matters most.”10
Furthermore, Gray noted that up to that point spacepower theory had been
approached as almost everything but what it most truly is: the military exploitation of a new geographical medium, and a domain that needs to be understood
on its own technical, tactical, and operational terms, if it is to produce maximum
strategic effectiveness. Gray made it clear, however, that the unique geography of
space does not point the way to some unique logic of strategy, let alone a unique
irrelevance of strategy.11 Hence, spacepower doctrine still must observe the enduring nature of war and strategic theory.
Gray also looked to historical experience to offer insights into the application
of spacepower. Drawing on the long-standing precedents of the application of
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seapower and airpower, Gray thought that spacepower was likely to play adjunct
or supporting roles during conflicts. Despite the dearth of strategic experience
in space and spacepower’s promise to bring comprehensive changes in the form
and structure of armed conflict, Gray noted that spacepower must not be thought
of as the panacea for terrestrial security ills. Additionally, he warned that new
sources of advantage bring new sources of vulnerability—a maxim that seems
especially prescient for the United States and its rivals today within the space
domain.12
TEACHER AND MENTOR
Gray had a significant and lasting commitment to his doctoral students, and
was kind and generous with his time. He routinely held brown-bag lunches and
strategic seminars at the universities at which he taught. During these gatherings,
his doctoral students had the opportunity to try out various thesis ideas, debate
among themselves, and hear any insights or suggestions that Gray had on the
subject. Gray felt it deeply important to prepare the next generation of strategists
and strategic thinkers, and it showed whenever he interacted with his students.
Even when in the midst of writing his latest book or preparing for the next class,
Gray graciously would carve out time in his schedule to hear about his students’
research and offer suggestions. Being his usual self when giving pointed feedback,
he displayed the gift of using great wit in telling stories and teaching memorable
lessons.
Let there be no mistake, however; Gray expected the highest levels of scholarship from those studying under him. As many of his students can attest, he
routinely gave extensive feedback on drafts of their doctoral theses. Often, the
margins of a thesis were full of his comments—in his famous red ink—regarding language use, the need for clarity, and the pitfalls of overstatement. Gray
consistently taught the lesson of never taking for granted that the reader would
invest time in your work; one should strive constantly to make one’s research and
writing the absolute best possible while getting to the “so what?” of the matter.
Ultimately, Gray’s teaching and mentorship likely are responsible for at least
one generation of spacepower theorists in the United States, as well as around
the world. He routinely recognized the talents of aspiring authors and helped
ensure that their works saw the light of day through publication.13 Working
behind the scenes, he also advanced the careers of others, including advocating
for those he mentored to fill teaching positions at universities when opportunities arose. Gray’s generosity and refreshing lack of towering ego were enhanced
by the fact that he was incredibly well connected, albeit quietly, within the U.S.
military space community. This lent credibility to his own ideas, as well as those
of others who studied under him. Through his steadfast efforts and support,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/7
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Gray developed and promoted a cadre of individuals who collectively advanced
spacepower strategic thought.
INSIGHTS FOR TODAY’S SPACE PROFESSIONALS
Much has changed since Gray first penned his ideas on spacepower theory. Recently the United States established the newest branch of its armed forces, the U.S.
Space Force, and published its inaugural space capstone publication, Spacepower:
Doctrine for Space Forces.14
Because of Gray’s consistent message regarding the enduring nature of war despite the application of new technologies and operational concepts, his writings
remain timeless in their utility and insights. What follows are some reminders
derived from Gray’s contributions for today’s space professionals and members of
the U.S. Space Force, as we consider the reemergence of great-power competition
and the ever-expanding national-security interests in space.
Space Is Not a Sanctuary
Gray routinely held views that differed from the prevalent thinking of the day.
Many of his contemporaries viewed space as a sanctuary that should be free of
conflict. While today the United States and many of its allies recognize space as
a “warfighting domain,” this is a recent phenomenon; in the early 1980s, it traditionally was held by most within the U.S. national-security space community that
space was a sanctuary, or a domain where military conflict would never extend.
Gray disagreed and stated emphatically in American Military Space Policy, “No
satellite system, no matter how high its orbit or sophisticated its survival aids,
enjoys assured survivability. Space is not a sanctuary.”15 Approaching spacepower theory in a way reflecting classical strategy leads to the understanding
that militarily useful geographies eventually will be exploited and contested.16 He
observed that many senior U.S. officials of the day incorrectly viewed the survivability of satellites in geosynchronous orbit as an irrefutable certainty.17
Many of his thoughts regarding the fallacies of the sanctuary school of thought
and the vulnerability of satellites were reflected in the spacepower writings that
followed.18 Providing a perspective based on experience and the fundamentals of
strategy, in his 2005 book Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare Gray observed
as follows: “It is a rule in strategy, one derived empirically from the evidence of
two and a half millennia, that anything of great strategic importance to one belligerent, for that reason has to be worth attacking by others. And the greater the
importance, the greater has to be the incentive to damage, disable, capture, or
destroy it. In the bluntest of statements: space warfare is a certainty in the future
because the use of space in war has become vital.”19
Gray understood the fallacies of viewing space as a sanctuary. Thinking this
way would result in developed and fielded space systems being vulnerable to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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attack and of questionable survivability during a conflict extending into space.
The dogmatic view of space being a sanctuary would lead to the dangerous condition of peacetime efficiency and convenience preventing serious preparations for
war. As a practical matter, and on the basis of historical experience, Gray viewed
the United States as having no realistic choice other than to be prepared to fight
in space—an enterprise that must involve the development of both offensive and
defensive capabilities.20
Challenges of Space Arms Control
Gray was a consistent critic of many arms-control approaches used during the
Cold War, including those related to the space domain.21 In his 1992 book House
of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, he wrote the following on the paradox of
arms control: “[T]he first paradox, dignified throughout the remainder of this
book as ‘the arms control paradox,’ postulates that if arms control is needed in
a strategic relationship because states in question might go to war, it will be impractical for that very reason of need, whereas, if arms control should prove to be
available, it will be irrelevant.”22
On the limitations of arms control and its frequent pitfalls, Gray noted that
many arms-control proponents asserted that the United States needed an armscontrol agreement far more than the Soviet Union did, because of the disparity
in space dependencies between the two sides. These advocates, however, tended
to neglect such crucial issues as the scope of activity to be constrained, methods
of verification, and the Soviet theory of war.23 On the whole, when considering
the various space arms-control proposals, he viewed them as “pious nonsense,”
because unduly uncritical obeisance was paid to an arms-control credo that reflected a triumph of hope over experience. Cutting to the crux of the problem,
Gray explained that “[h]istory and the common sense of international politics
tells us that one cannot legislate against military technologies that states have
strong incentives to pursue.” In contrast to the arms-control advocates of the
time, the Soviets understood and used the arms-control process as one of several
interdependent instruments of conducting international relations effectively and
limiting the strengths of other countries, including the United States.24
Gray thought that the United States should not sign any arms-control treaty
formally conceding superiority to the Soviet Union.25 He thought historical
experience had demonstrated that the Soviet Union had violated arms-control
agreements when it was administratively convenient, militarily advantageous,
and economically efficient to do so.26 Without a sound understanding of the
technological trends that should be encouraged or discouraged, “arms control
negotiators are engaged in an exercise that is little more than a lottery.” Gray was a
staunch advocate of the United States maintaining its strategic advantage in space
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capabilities, and he consistently advised U.S. policy leaders that the United States
should not seek to obtain, or settle for, equality in space weaponry (whether it be
equality in deployment or nondeployment of space capabilities).27 He confessed,
“I am profoundly skeptical of the likely practical value of the arms control process to help fashion a military space environment conducive to the best interests
of the United States.” Gray believed that solutions to the dilemmas of deterring
conflict must be sought in the realm of politics, “not in weapons technologies or
in arms-control band-aids.”28
A key takeaway for space professionals is that these inherent problems associated with arms control likely will reemerge during any future discussions
on banning military technologies that states have strong incentives to pursue,
such as direct-ascent, hit-to-kill antisatellite missiles or on-orbit kinetic-kill
vehicles.
Be Wary of the Next “Big Idea”
Gray noted that there is a long history of the periodic reemergence of technology’s application as a “hot” and “new” strategic concept within the U.S. defense
community. He observed the succession of purportedly novel strategic concepts
that repeatedly have gained popularity, and then official endorsements, on the
basis of a largely false promise of superior performance. He warned, “There will
always be a market for new sounding ideas expressed in jargon and neatly acronymic. They come, they go, and they reappear in slightly different guise in the
future.”29 Technology zealots’ claims that new strategic concepts will guarantee
winning of the next war fall within the “zone of snake oil salesmanship.”30
Because space warfare frequently involves advanced technology, and because
space only recently has come to be considered a domain for conflict, space professionals should remain vigilant against those touting the next “big idea.” Consistent through much of his writings, Gray advised current and future strategists
that there are just three defenses against the usually false—or at least exaggerated—strategic promise of the hot, new concept: common sense, experience, and
a sound education in strategy—especially in the enduring works of Thucydides,
Sun-tzu, and Clausewitz.31
Predictive Failure Will Occur
Gray also observed a frequent trend—especially within defense policy circles
and think tanks within Washington, DC—of seeking to predict the future. He
warned against this predilection and the pervasive use of the phrase “the foreseeable future.” Gray warned that the future is not knowable in any detail. One of the
responsibilities of the strategist, Gray advised, is to prevent “the enthronement of
the kind of official strategic certainty which precludes the development of strategic and military postural flexibility.”32 Experts and policy makers who advance
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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a knowable and certain future are dangerous to their organizations, as well to
those in the fighting forces who will need to carry out their ill-conceived vision.
In contrast, Gray thought that strategists need to acknowledge the reality that
predictive failure will occur. Strategists must contend with friction, chance, and
uncertainty, and consequently strategists should be adaptable and flexible over a
range of plausible—and some implausible—threats, to protect national interests
wherever they lie. In providing guidance regarding an unknowable future, Gray
wrote that “strategists have no choice other than to cope with their unavoidable
ignorance as best they may.”33 Consequently, today’s space professionals and strategists should plan across the gamut of scenarios and potential futures to account
for the inherent failings of predictive analysis.
Space Is Critical, but Avoid Overstatement
Gray frequently advised that spacepower should fit within a joint war-fighting
framework and the larger wartime effort. He commented, “Spacepower must
always be useful, but its precise roles and actual strategic utility will be distinctive to each class and case of conflict.”34 The lesson for competition in space is
that planning should include conditions in which space-related activities will
contribute significantly to war’s conclusion, and those situations in which it will
not. When advocating for the importance of including spacepower and space
capabilities in joint and coalition warfare, Gray advised, “Space warriors today
should not compensate for the general underappreciation in the armed services
by indulging in overstatement.”35 It is paramount that space professionals understand fully the implications of space being a war-fighting domain, while acknowledging the limits of spacepower.
Even though there are no reasons why space operations cannot deliver decisive
strategic effects to achieve success, the conditions allowing for such a victory
should be considered rare indeed. This is because for conflict to have the greatest
impact and affect the strategic level of war, it must affect the preponderance of
people where they live. Gray wrote, “[A]ll conflict must have terrestrial reference
because man can live only upon the land.” As a result, there will be practical limits
to what space operations can achieve strategically, no matter how significant a
level of command of space is achieved or how well operations are executed. Although command of space may achieve strategic effect, tactical and operational
space actions will be strategically decisive in determining a war’s outcome only
on the rarest occasions. This is because strategic effect is decided by the target,
not by the means of attack.36
Gray viewed spacepower as often augmenting the effectiveness of air, sea, and
land power.37 In noting how space forces and capabilities should be used during
conflict, Gray observed, “Military space ventures have been inherently adjunct,
supportive, and ancillary to the main terrestrial action of modern strategy.”38
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/7

8

Klein: Some Lessons on Spacepower from Colin Gray

KLEIN

53

Each branch of the armed forces has distinctive strengths and limitations, and
space forces must contribute to this joint endeavor to achieve success in deterrence and war. Space warfare necessitates thinking about spacepower from a joint
perspective and an all-domain approach. Consequently, spacepower and associated space capabilities should embrace their role within the application of land-,
maritime-, and air-focused military forces.
Being in a supporting role, however, does not make space forces less important. Indeed, winning in the space domain is still critical. Gray commented, “As
the leading edge of overall U.S. combat potency, space power will decide the
course and outcome of some conflicts, even though space forces may not themselves be combat forces with offensive capabilities.”39
Gray’s ideas and writings inspired many to advance the cause of strategy, including that related to the space domain.40 His ability to explain the most complex
ideas in a simple manner while always answering the “so what?” question was a
true gift to the development of spacepower theory. He crafted strategic lessons
for spacepower on the basis of the universal principles of strategy and essential
unity in all strategic experience.
While many of Gray’s ideas were considered novel and counter to mainstream
spacepower thinking at the time, his writings and ideas have gained acceptance
over time. In fact, his “intellectual fingerprints” are all over many of the most
significant works on spacepower, even including the aforementioned Spacepower:
Doctrine for Space Forces, which was published in June 2020. Most importantly,
because his ideas on strategy are based on historical experience within the context of the enduring nature of war, his writings remain timeless in their relevance
today and will remain so into the future.
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